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Abstract: 
Previous evidence suggests that less liquid stocks entail higher average returns. Using NYSE 
data, we present evidence that both the sensitivity of returns to liquidity and liquidity premia 
have significantly declined over the past four decades to levels that we cannot statistically 
distinguish from zero. Furthermore, the profitability of trading strategies based on buying 
illiquid stocks and selling illiquid stocks has declined over the past four decades, rendering 
such strategies virtually unprofitable. Our results are robust to several conventional liquidity 
measures related to volume. When using liquidity measure that is not related to volume, we 
find just weak evidence of a liquidity premium even in the early periods of our sample. The 
gradual introduction and proliferation of index funds and exchange traded funds is a possible 
explanation for these results. 
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1 Introduction
Starting from the seminal work of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), it has been 
argued that transaction costs and liquidity have an important effect on the prices of 
financial assets. Amihud and Mendelson assume exogenous trading frequencies and 
conclude that less liquid securities yield higher expected returns, which in turn benefit 
investors with long trading horizons. Furthermore, the price effects of illiquidity may be 
first order, since the price reflects the present value of all future transaction costs.
1
The empirical presence of liquidity premia has been investigated extensively for 
various asset classes and by using several different methodologies.
2 Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986, 1989), Amihud (2002), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Brennan, 
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Eleswarapu (1997), among many others, find 
that different measures of illiquidity are associated with higher future stock returns.
3
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) find similar results in bond markets. Recent studies (e.g., 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Sadka (2006), Korajczyk 
and Sadka (2008)), and Charoenrook and Conrad (2008) have taken liquidity premia one 
step further and argued that liquidity is a priced risk factor.
4
In this paper we argue that the sensitivity of expected returns to conventional 
1This idea has been subject to some theoretical debate, as models that endogenize the trading frequency 
suggest that the price effect of transaction costs is second order. See Constantinides (1986) and Vayanos 
(1998), as opposed to Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007). 
2 For a comprehensive survey of this literature see Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2006). 
3 Some exceptions should be noted. Hasbrouck (2006) finds only weak pricing effects of illiquidity.  
Spiegel and Wang (2005) find that much of the pricing effect of illiquidity is subsumed by the effect of 
idiosyncratic risk. Barclay, Kandel, and Marx (1998) do not find a significant price effect following a 
change in liquidity resulting from stocks moving between NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX. 
4Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2007) show divergence over time between the systematic liquidity components 
of small-cap and large-cap firms. They attribute their findings to patterns of institutional ownership over 
their sample period.  2
measures of liquidity has significantly declined over the past 40 years. Obviously, 
liquidity itself has improved over the years following numerous regulatory reforms (such 
as decimalization) and technological improvements. Our key insight, however, is distinct 
from this point. Our main claim is not regarding liquidity itself; rather, we argue that the 
effect of each unit of liquidity on returns has declined over the years. In a practical sense, 
we hypothesize that if we put returns on the left-hand side of a regression and a 
conventional measure of liquidity on the right-hand side, then the coefficient of liquidity 
declines over time (in absolute value), and the total effect (liquidity times the coefficient) 
declines over time. We further argue that the profitability of liquidity-based long-short 
trading strategies has decreased over the years. 
We test these hypotheses using NYSE common stocks between 1964 and 2005. Our 
main tests employ three popular volume-related measures of liquidity. The first measure 
is an inflation-adjusted version of Amihud’s illiquidity measure (Amihud, 2002), defined 
as the absolute return per unit of 1 million dollar volume. This measure is easy to 
calculate from daily CRSP data, and it has gained popularity in recent years as a useful 
measure of illiquidity (see, e.g., Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Korajczyk and Sadka 
(2008), and Kamara, Lou and Sadka (2007)). Adjusting for inflation is needed to 
facilitate comparisons over time, since the real value of dollar volume is changing.  
The two other volume-related liquidity measures are the annual dollar volume, and 
annual turnover. These measures have frequently been used as liquidity proxies (e.g., 
Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman 
(2001), Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), and Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998)). 
We also use one liquidity measure that is not related to volume. This is Roll’s 3
(1984) measure of the effective bid-ask spread obtained using a Gibbs estimator as in 
Hasbrouck (2006).
In our first set of tests we use a Fama-MacBeth approach to estimate the effect of 
liquidity on returns and the liquidity premium during different sub-periods of our sample 
period (1964–2005). We use a sequence of parametric and non-parametric tests to show 
that over this time period both the sensitivity of returns to liquidity and liquidity premia 
have declined. For example, we find that the sensitivity of monthly returns to Amihud’s 
measure of illiquidity has dropped from being positive and large, both statistically and 
economically, between 1964 and 1973 to an amount that is not statistically different from 
zero starting from the mid 1970s. Furthermore, the average annual liquidity premium has 
declined from about 1.8% in the 1960s and early 1970s to an amount that is not 
significantly different from zero starting in the mid 1970s. Qualitatively similar results 
are obtained using the other two volume-related measures of liquidity, the only difference 
being that the decline becomes significant in the mid 1980s. 
We further show that popular trading strategies based on buying illiquid stocks and 
selling liquid stocks have lost much of their profitability over the years. For example, 
applying Amihud’s measure and using an out-of-sample analysis, we show that a trading 
strategy that buys the top decile of illiquid stocks and sells the bottom decile yielded an 
average annual Fama-French four-factor alpha of 9.4% between 1964 and 1973. Starting 
from the mid 1970s, the average alpha of such strategies is not significantly different 
from zero. Again, qualitatively similar results are obtained when using dollar volume and 
turnover as measures of liquidity, the only difference being that the trading strategies 
cease to be profitable in the mid 1980s.  4
Naturally, firm size and liquidity are highly correlated. Importantly, our results 
regarding the decline in the effect of liquidity on returns are distinct from well-
documented trends in the small-firm anomaly (e.g., Fama and French (1992), Dichev 
(1998), and Schwert (2003)). We verify this in three ways. First, in our regression 
analysis we control for size effects. Second, in our analysis of liquidity-based trading 
strategies we control for the sensitivity of the liquidity-based portfolios to common 
variations in small vs. large firms (the SMB factor). Finally, we present an analysis in 
which we pre-sort the data by size. The decline in profitability of liquidity-based 
strategies applies to all size cohorts. 
When using Hasbrouck’s version of Roll’s measure of liquidity (which proxies for 
half of the effective bid-ask spread and is not directly related to volume) we find different 
results from those obtained using the volume-related liquidity measures. First, we cannot 
identify a significant sensitivity of returns to liquidity or a liquidity premium even in the 
early periods of our analysis. Second, we do not find any decline in the liquidity 
premium, since we start and end the time series with amounts that are not statistically 
different from zero. Thus, like Hasbrouck (2006), we find that stock liquidity has 
different facets. The facets related to volume seem to have been priced in the early 
periods of our analysis, while others were not. The consistent result across all measures is 
that in the later periods none of them seems to be priced in our sample. 
Overall, the results show a strong decline in the effect of volume-related liquidity 
on expected returns in NYSE stocks. Depending on the liquidity measure used, starting 
from the mid 1970s or 1980s we cannot distinguish the liquidity premium from zero, and 
liquidity-based trading strategies appear to be unprofitable.5
These results are important for both valuation and asset management applications. 
The existence of liquidity premia plays a central role in the valuation of financial assets. 
A 1% decrease in the discount rate may translate into a 10%–20% increase in valuation. 
Furthermore, liquidity-based long-short trading strategies have become very common, 
especially for hedge funds. Our findings cast doubt on the profitability of such strategies 
in recent years for stocks listed on NYSE. 
We present two possible explanations for these results. The first is based on hedge 
fund proliferation in the past few decades. It is possible that hedge-funds, being long-
horizon traders who incur relatively small transaction costs, “arbitrage away” the 
liquidity premium by buying illiquid stocks and short-selling liquid stocks. The second 
explanation is related to financial innovation. We conjecture that the presence of financial 
instruments that allow investors to buy and sell illiquid assets indirectly (such as index 
funds and ETFs) works to lower the sensitivity of returns to liquidity. These instruments 
enable investors to hold illiquid stocks indirectly for very low transaction costs, 
prolonging the investment horizon of the marginal investor in illiquid stocks, and thereby 
reducing the sensitivity of returns to liquidity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
main variables of interest. Section 3 presents the empirical results regarding the decline in 
liquidity coefficients and liquidity premia. Section 4 presents the results regarding the 
decline in profitability of liquidity-based trading strategies. Section 5 discusses possible 
explanations for the results. We conclude in Section 6. 6
2       Data and Main Variables
Our sample consists of all NYSE common stocks drawn from CRSP between 
January 1964 and December 2005 with share codes 10 or 11 (common shares), which 
excludes ETFs, REITs, closed end funds, primes, and scores. 
We do not consider NASDAQ stocks for two reasons. First, CRSP data on 
NASDAQ until 1983 is very scarce, precluding a valid longitudinal analysis of NASDAQ 
illiquidity using any liquidity measure. Second, our main liquidity measures are a 
function of volume. It is well known that volume in NASDAQ is inflated (see Atkins and 
Dyl (1997)). Furthermore, the amount of inflation in volume numbers has varied over the 
years because of the introduction of electronic communications networks (ECNs) and 
other mechanisms that enable traders to bypass the dealer system. This prevents the use 
of volume-related measures in a time-series analysis of NASDAQ liquidity.   
The results reported in the paper also exclude AMEX stocks. Our concern here is 
that the reduction in the number of common stocks traded on AMEX over our sample 
period could generate trends in the data that might contaminate the findings. For 
example, starting from the year 2000, the number of stocks available for our analysis on 
AMEX is only about 200.
We use four measures of liquidity. The first three are related to trading volume, and 
the fourth is a measure of transaction cost. Our first liquidity measure is a modified 
version of the measure presented in Amihud (2002). This is an annual measure of 
illiquidity in the spirit of Kyle’s (1985) lambda, calculated based on the annual averages 
of daily absolute price changes adjusted for dollar volume and for inflation. Formally, 
Amihud’s measure for firm i in year t is denoted by Amihudi,t and is given by 7
,
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where Ridt is the return of stock i in day dof year t, VOLDidt is the dollar volume (in 
millions) of stock i on day d of year t, Dit is the number of available trading days for 
stock i in year t, and infdt is an adjustment factor for inflation, which allows us to present 
Amihud’s measure using end-of-2005 prices. Such an adjustment is necessary since the 
real economic meaning of dollar volume has changed significantly over the years. For 
robustness we have also used a version of Amihud’s measure scaled by total stock-
market capitalization. The results (not reported here) are similar. 
The two additional volume-related liquidity measures are dollar volume, defined as 
the logarithm of the annual dollar volume (in millions), and turnover, defined as annual 
share volume divided by the average number of outstanding shares throughout the year. 
Our fourth measure is related to transaction costs and not directly to trade volume. 
This is the annual average of Roll’s estimate of effective half bid-ask spread (Roll, 1984). 
The idea behind this measure is that in the absence of new information, daily price 
changes should exhibit negative autocorrelation. Moreover, the bid-ask spread is 
proportional to the square root of negative the covariance of daily price changes. In 
practice, this covariance is often positive, making the estimation of the spread 
problematic. Hasbrouck (2006) solved this problem by using a Bayesian Gibbs estimator 
that imposes a negative prior on the covariance to estimate the spread. Hereafter we 
denote this measure by Roll-Hasbrouck (RH). Our estimates of the RH measure were 
obtained from Joel Hasbrouck’s webpage. As discussed in Hasbrouck (2006), the 
correlation between the Gibbs estimator and TAQ data bid-ask spreads for 1993–2005 is 8
0.965.
Similar to Amihud (2002), to ensure the reliability of the data in the annual 
calculations, we calculate the liquidity measures only for stocks that satisfy the following 
two requirements: (i) the stock must have return data for at least 150 trading days during 
the year; and (ii) the stock must be listed at the end of the year and have a year-end price 
higher than $5. We also censored the upper and lower 1% of the distribution of Amihud’s 
illiquidity measures to avoid outliers.
5 After we account for these restrictions, the number 
of stocks in our sample ranges from 1,053 in 1964 to 1,338 in 2005.
6
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the four liquidity measures. The median of 
Amihud’s measure is 2.8%, suggesting that the median absolute price change associated 
with $1 million of volume (in 2005 prices) is 2.8%. The median of the annual turnover is 
41%. The median of the log of dollar volume is 5.02, suggesting that median dollar 
volume in our sample is about $150 million. Finally, the median of Roll’s measure in our 
period is 0.37%, suggesting that the median estimated bid-ask spread in the sample is 
0.74%.
Figure 1 plots the evolvement over time of the four liquidity measures. For each 
year we plot the equal-weighted average of the liquidity measures across the firms 
available for analysis during that year. The picture in all four measures seems similar: 
while liquidity seemed to fluctuate during the 1970s and 1980s, it appears to be 
improving since the early 1990s. This is consistent with the several market reforms (such 
as decimalization) and technological changes that took effect during these years. Chordia,
Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) study the determinants of this trend. They find that the 
5 Censoring the data based on the other liquidity measures yielded similar results. 
6 These are average numbers. Our analysis is done on a monthly basis and the actual number changes 
somewhat from month to month. 9
increased turnover is associated with more frequent smaller orders and with higher level of 
institutional holdings. It is important to distinguish between this gradual improvement in 
liquidity and the effect of liquidity on returns, which is the focus of this paper. The fact 
that liquidity has improved does not by itself mean that the sensitivity of returns to 
illiquidity has changed or that liquidity premia have gone down.  
Table 1 also reports summary statistics for additional variables used in the analysis. 
The main dependent variable is the stock return. We use monthly returns from CRSP and  
adjust the returns to account for delisting bias.
7
Following Amihud (2002), we calculate beta using a methodology in the spirit of 
Fama and French (1992) as follows. At the end of each year t, we rank stocks by their 
market capitalization and divide them into ten equal portfolios. We then estimate ten 
market models for year t in which the dependent variable is the daily excess return of one 
of the above ten portfolios, and the explanatory variable is the daily market excess return 
using the Scholes and Williams (1977) method. The beta assigned to each individual 
stock i in year t is the estimated beta of the size portfolio containing this stock. The 
resulting average beta in the sample is 1.03, and the median is 1.04. 
Other variables of interest whose summary statistics are reported in Table 1 are 
market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, daily standard deviation of returns (sdret), 
dividend yield (divyld), and two variables that account for past returns in an attempt to 
capture short-term momentum effects (R100 and R100yr). 
7 Our approach here follows Shumway (1997) and is similar to Amihud (2002). The last return used is 
either the last return available on CRSP, or the delisting return, if available. Shumway  finds an average 
delisting return of –30% using OTC returns of delisted stocks. We thus assign a return of –30% if a 
delisting is coded as 500 (reason unavailable), 520 (went to OTC), 551–573 and 580 (various reasons), 574 
(bankruptcy) and 584 (does not meet exchange financial guidelines). 10
Table 2 reports averages of the monthly cross-sectional correlations between the 
main variables of interest from January 1964 to December 2005. It is important to keep in 
mind that Amihud’s and Roll-Hasbrouck’s measures are negative measures of liquidity 
(they measure illiquidity), whereas dollar volume and turnover are positive measures of 
liquidity. Given this, the four liquidity measures are correlated as expected. However, the 
correlations are not extremely high. The highest correlation among the four is between 
the log of dollar volume and Amihud’s illiquidity measure (–0.65). Apparently, the four 
measures reflect somewhat different aspects of liquidity.
Importantly, the correlation between the log of firm size (Lnsize) and the log of 
dollar volume (Lndvol) is very high at 0.87. This makes it virtually impossible to draw 
statistical inferences when using these two variables in one regression. For this reason, 
we do not present some of our regression analysis with the volume measure. We discuss 
this further below. 
3   Analysis of Time Trends 
Our main hypotheses are that (i) the sensitivity of returns to liquidity has declined 
over the period 1964–2005; and (ii) liquidity premia have declined over this time period. 
To start, we test these hypotheses by employing the Fama-MacBeth (1973) methodology 
to estimate the sensitivity of returns to illiquidity from monthly cross-sections of stocks. 
We use a series of parametric and non-parametric tests to check for trends in the liquidity 
coefficients and liquidity premia.  
To minimize the error-in-variables problem we carry out the analysis on liquidity-
based portfolios. For each month m in year t between January 1964 and December 2005 11
(504 months) we sort the stocks in our sample into 100 portfolios based on their previous 
year level of liquidity. We do this for each liquidity measure. Then, for each month we 
estimate a cross-sectional regression of the form: 
,1
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That is, we regress the returns of portfolio i=1,…,100 in month m of year t on a set of J
explanatory variables calculated using data from year t–1. This ensures that the 
explanatory variables are known to investors at the time that monthly returns are realized. 
The explanatory variables used in the regression are the equal-weighted variables of each 
portfolio’s constituents. 
The main explanatory variables are the four liquidity measures. We include 
additional explanatory variables that have been shown (or are suspected) to be 
determinants of returns. These are beta (beta), size (market capitalization), momentum, 
book-to-market, standard deviation of returns, and dividend yield. 
For the purpose of our analysis, the main output from the above regressions is 
twofold. First, for each liquidity measure we obtain 504 monthly estimates of the 
sensitivity of returns to liquidity - one for each month in the sample period. Second, 
multiplying these monthly coefficients by the average liquidity measure of the relevant 
month, we obtain an estimate of the monthly liquidity premium.
8 We then use these 
coefficient estimates and the estimates of the illiquidity premia to test for trends. 
To begin, Table 3 presents a standard Fama-MacBeth analysis of the entire 
sample period. For each explanatory variable the table reports the average of the 
8 The premium has an intuitive economic meaning only for Amihud’s and Roll’s measures, as for these the 
case of a measure equal to zero corresponds to perfect liquidity. Hence, we report the premium only for 
these two measures.  12
coefficient based on all of the monthly observations, as well as a t-statistic testing against 
the null hypothesis that this average is zero. The results are quite typical of this kind of 
test. First, as noted by Fama and French (1992), beta is not priced. Second, book-to-
market and momentum are priced in the familiar way: “value” (high book-to-market) 
stocks entail higher returns, and winners stay winners in the short run.
The relevant part for our purposes is the coefficient of the four liquidity measures. 
It is significant for Amihud’s measure and turnover, and insignificant for volume and 
Roll-Hasbrouck’s measure. To see the economic magnitude of the coefficients, consider 
for example specification (1), which is related to Amihud’s measure. A coefficient of 
0.44 implies that an increase of one standard deviation in Amihud’s measure (0.185; see 
Table 1) would increase monthly returns by 0.44%*0.185=0.0814%. On a yearly basis 
this amounts to approximately 1%. The average monthly liquidity premium estimated 
using this specification (bottom of the table) is 0.024%, which translates into an annual 
premium of approximately 0.3%. Note that these numbers are economically quite large. 
A 1% increase in discount rates would typically translate in standard valuation models 
into a discount of about 10%–20% in value (depending on the discount rate and the 
assumptions about expected growth).  
It seems, then, that over the entire sample period, liquidity is priced in an 
economically and statistically significant way for some measures but not for others. We 
argue that this inconclusive result reflects a mix of highly significant liquidity 
coefficients in the beginning of our sample period, and low and insignificant liquidity 
coefficients more recently. 13
To get a first impression of the plausibility of this assertion, in Figure 2A we plot 
the liquidity regression coefficients obtained from Eq. (1) using Amihud’s measure over 
time. For each year the figure depicts the average monthly estimates of the liquidity 
coefficient for that year. While these coefficient estimates are noisy and seem to fluctuate 
quite a bit, there appears to be a clear downward trend. Similarly, Figure 2B plots the 
average liquidity premium, which again appears to be quite noisy but clearly downward 
trending. The analysis below formally tests for the existence of these trends.
In our first attempt to identify trends in the liquidity coefficients we divide the 42 
years in our sample period into four sub-periods of 10 or 11 years. The idea behind 
slicing the entire sample period into sub-periods is to neutralize some of the noise in the 
monthly coefficients by averaging them over several years of data. For example, in 
examining Figure 2A one might wonder whether the trend is an artifact of the very high 
coefficient in 1969 or the very low coefficient in 1999. By using 10–11 years of data in 
each sub-period we have 120–132 monthly observations per sub-period, which is likely 
to alleviate some of the inevitable noise. Another approach would be to use non-
parametric tests for trend (see below). 
The sub-periods we consider are: Period 1 is 1964–1973, Period 2 is 1974–1984, 
Period 3 is 1985–1995, and Period 4 is 1996–2005. We then apply the Fama-MacBeth 
analysis (as above) separately to each of the sub-periods and compare the resulting 
coefficients.  
The results are presented in Table 4. As before, the coefficients reported in the 
table are the averages of the coefficients of the monthly cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth 
regressions over the relevant time periods.  14
Consider first the results for Amihud’s measure. The average liquidity coefficient 
in Period 1 is 2.54 with a t-stat of 3.01. By contrast, the coefficients in Periods 2, 3, and 4 
are not significantly different from zero. The average monthly liquidity premium in 
Period 1 is 0.15%, or approximately 1.8% in annual terms. In Periods 2, 3, and 4 the 
monthly liquidity premium is not significantly different from zero.
When we use turnover as a measure of liquidity we find that returns are sensitive 
to liquidity in the first two sub-periods. The coefficients on turnover become insignificant 
starting from the third period. As mentioned above, because of the high correlation 
between the log of dollar volume and size we cannot use these regressions to assess the 
effect of volume on returns while controlling for size. In non-tabulated results we 
estimated the liquidity coefficients using volume without controlling for size. These show 
significant effects in Periods 1 and 2 and insignificant effect in Periods 3 and 4, similar to 
the results with turnover. 
The results using Roll-Hasbrouck’s measure are completely different. In all four 
time periods the coefficient of liquidity is not significant and neither is the liquidity 
premium. 
Given these results, and to further increase the power of our tests by decreasing 
noise, we group Periods 1 and 2 into one early sub-period extending from 1964 to 1984, 
and Periods 3 and 4 into one later sub-period extending from 1985 to 2005. We then 
repeat the analysis for each of the two half-sample periods. The results are reported in 
Table 5.
Consider the results for Amihud’s measure. Between 1964 and 1984 the 
coefficient estimate is 1.1 and the monthly liquidity premium is 0.055%. Both are 15
statistically significant. By contrast, between 1985 and 2005 both the liquidity coefficient 
and the premium are not statistically different from zero. A comparison of the liquidity 
coefficient and the liquidity premium across the two periods (bottom of table) shows a 
statistically significant decline in both specifications. For robustness and to reduce 
possible effects of outliers we also use the Wilcoxon non-parametric test. The results 
again show a significant decline in both coefficient and premium.  
A qualitatively similar but statistically even stronger result is obtained using the 
turnover measure. By contrast, when using Roll-Hasbrouck’s measure we cannot identify 
any liquidity premium in either sub-period, and the difference between the periods is 
insignificant using both parametric and non-parametric tests. 
We next turn to a set of non-parametric tests of trend. The main concern from the 
above analysis is that the averaging of monthly coefficients across sub-periods does not 
do a good enough job in cancelling out noisy observations, and that the results are driven 
by just a few outliers. The advantage of non-parametric tests of trend is that they consider 
only the order of the magnitudes of the coefficients, and do not account for the magnitude 
itself. Thus, extremely high or low coefficient estimates do not have an unusual effect on 
the test results, unlike with parametric methods.  
We apply two standard non-parametric tests of trend: the Spearman test and the 
Kendall test. Like the standard Pearson’s correlation, these non-parametric tests produce 
a number between –1 and 1, and allow for rejecting the null hypothesis of no trend. We 
apply these tests to the time series of 504 liquidity coefficients obtained by each measure 
and similarly to the time series of estimated monthly liquidity premia. The non-
parametric tests as well as standard Pearson’s correlations between the variables and time 16
are reported in Table 6. The results show a significant negative time trend in the 
coefficients using both Amihud’s measure and Turnover. No trend is identified with the 
coefficients related to Roll-Hasbrouck’s measure.  
Overall, the parametric and non-parametric analyses reinforce one another. They 
both support the claim that liquidity coefficients and liquidity premia have been trending 
down for volume-related measures. No liquidity premium (and thus, no trend) is 
identified for Roll-Hasbrouck’s measure. 
4  Profitability of Liquidity-Based Trading Strategies 
The higher expected returns of illiquid stocks have long attracted long-term 
investors, who tried to reap the higher gains, not having to liquidate early. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many hedge funds use long-short strategies, buying illiquid stocks 
and short-selling liquid stocks of the same class. Are such strategies still profitable given 
our results on the decline in liquidity premia? 
To answer this question, for each year between 1964 and 2005 we sort the stocks 
into deciles based on their annual liquidity level. We do this sort for each of the four 
liquidity measures. The most illiquid stocks in each year are placed in Decile 1 (the top 
decile), whereas the most liquid stocks are in Decile 10 (the bottom decile). We then 
construct three rolling portfolios. The first is a portfolio of the most illiquid stocks based 
on illiquidity estimations in the previous year. Thus, this portfolio assigns equal weights 
to all stocks in the top liquidity decile for a given year, and it rebalances the holdings 
once a year on January 1. The second portfolio is composed of the most liquid stocks, and 17
thus assigns equal weights to all the stocks in the bottom decile, again rebalanced 
annually. A third portfolio is a long-short portfolio that is long in the illiquid portfolio 
and short in the liquid one. 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the average monthly excess returns for these three 
portfolios over the four sub-periods described above for each of the four liquidity 
measures. The most striking results in this panel are for the excess returns on the long-
short portfolio (top minus bottom). Consider first the results for Amihud’s measure. The 
average monthly excess return on the “top-minus-bottom” portfolio between 1964 and 
1973 is 0.81%, which amounts to approximately 9.7% annually. Surprisingly, the average 
excess return of this long-short portfolio is even higher (1.46%) in the second sub-period. 
However, in the two sub-periods starting from 1985, the average excess return of the 
long-short portfolio is not statistically different from zero. To test for trend, in Panel B 
we compare the sub-periods 1964–1984 and 1985–2005. The difference in excess returns 
of the long-short strategy between the two sub-periods is highly significant (t-stat of 3.34, 
Wilcoxon test of 3.15). Similar results are obtained when using volume as a liquidity 
measure. By contrast, Roll-Hasbrouck’s measure shows only weak evidence of decline in 
excess returns, and turnover does not show any evidence of excess returns in any sub-
period.
To further evaluate the profitability of liquidity-based strategies we estimate out-
of-sample alphas of the three portfolios relative to the Fama-French four factors (excess 
market return, HML, SMB, and UMD) for each liquidity measure. Our approach here is 
similar to Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Chordia, Subrahmanyam, 
and Anshuman (2001). For each month m between 1964 and 2005 we regress the 18
monthly excess returns of the three liquidity portfolios on the returns of the Fama-French 
four factors during the preceding 60 months: m–60 to m–1. Thus, for each month m in our 
sample period we obtain an estimate of the four-factor loadings as of that month. Denote 
these factor loadings by EMKT,p,m, EHML,p,m, ESMB,p,m, and EUMD,p,m, where, for example, 
EMKT,p,m stands for the loading on the market factor related to month m and portfolio p
(one of the three liquidity portfolios). Now, for each month m we calculate the out-of-
sample four-factor alpha of portfolio p (denote Alpham,p) as the realized excess return of 
the portfolio less the expected excess return calculated from the realized returns on the 
factors and the estimated factor loadings: 
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where RETp,m, RETMKT,m, and Rfm are the realized returns on portfolio p, the CRSP value-
weighted index, and the risk-free rate, respectively, during month m; and SMBm, HMLm,
and UMDm are the appropriate realized returns on the factor portfolios in month m.
For each of the three portfolios we thus obtain a time series of between 120 and 132 out-
of-sample alpha estimates for each of the sub-periods defined above. Panel A of Table 8 
reports the averages of these alpha estimates for each liquidity measure.  
Consider first Amihud’s illiquidity measure. In the first two sub-periods, a long 
investment in this portfolio yielded average out-of-sample monthly four-factor alphas of 
0.50% and 0.27%, respectively. Both are statistically significant. In contrast, the average 
alpha of this portfolio is not significantly different from zero in the two later sub-periods. 
As for the bottom decile (the most liquid stocks), a short position in these stocks yielded 
an average positive monthly alpha of 0.27% in sub-period 1. However, starting from 19
Period 2 and on, the average alpha of this portfolio is not significantly different from 
zero. Finally, the long-short portfolio tells a similar story. A strategy that is long in the 
most illiquid stocks and short in the most liquid stocks yielded an average monthly alpha 
of 0.78% in Period 1. However, in the later periods, the average alphas are not 
significantly different from zero. Figure 3 depicts the trend of alphas over the sample 
priod.
A similar down-trend is revealed when we examine the long-short portfolios for 
the two other volume-related measures. The average alphas are significant in the earlier 
two periods and become insignificant in later periods. By contrast, Roll-Hasbrouck’s 
measure does not show any liquidity-related alpha in any period, and consequently also 
no trend. 
In Panel B we again divide the sample period into two sub-periods and compare 
the alpha estimates between them. The results confirm a statistically and economically 
significant decline in the profitability of the long, short, and long-short strategies for all 
three volume-related liquidity measures. These strategies appear to be unprofitable 
starting from the mid 1980s. By contrast, the results show no alpha (and no trend) related 
to Roll-Hasbrouck’s measure. 
To check the robustness of the results regarding the trends in alphas of the long-
short portfolio we have used the Spearman and Kendall non-parametric tests applied to 
the time series of all 504 monthly alpha estimates. The Spearman and Kendall 
coefficients (not tabulated) are negative for all three volume-related measures, with p-
values of less than 0.03. Thus, the null hypothesis of no trend in profitability of long-20
short liquidity-based portfolios is rejected. By contrast, when using Roll-Hasbrouck’s 
measure, we cannot identify any trend using the non-parametric tests. 
We next examine more closely the important relation between liquidity and firm 
size. Prior research has pointed out that the effect of firm size on expected returns has 
declined since the early 1980s (e.g., Fama and French (1992), Dichev (1998), and 
Schwert (2003)). Our Fama-MacBeth regressions control for firm size, already taking any 
trends in this variable into account. In our portfolio analysis we have taken into account 
the sensitivity of our liquidity-based portfolios to systematic size effects by adjusting for 
the SMB factor. Still, a concern is that the results obtained so far somehow reflect a size 
effect in a non-linear fashion.
To check whether this is indeed the case, we repeat the prior analysis by first 
sorting stocks by firm size. That is, for each month in our sample period we sort the 
stocks into five size quintiles. We then construct five liquidity-based long-short portfolios 
as above within each size quintile. The portfolios are rebalanced annually. The idea is 
that if size effects are driving the decline in the profitability of liquidity-based portfolios, 
then sorting first by firm size would eliminate the liquidity effect within each size 
quintile. By contrast, if we do see a decline in the profitability of liquidity-based 
portfolios within the size quintiles, then this effect is independent of documented trends 
in the size effect. 
Table 9 reports separate four-factor alpha averages for liquidity-based long-short 
portfolios within each size quintile for each liquidity measure. Sizes 1-5 refer to the 
smallest to largest quintiles, respectively. The results confirm that the decline in the 
liquidity effect applies to all firm sizes for the three volume-related liquidity measures.  21
Consider for example the results for Amihud’s measure. In the first period (1964–
1973), the average alphas are positive and significant both statistically and economically 
within all size quintiles. By contrast, the average alphas are not significantly different 
from zero for all size quintiles in the last period (1996–2005). The size quintiles do differ 
to some extent in the path of the decline in alphas. Qualitatively, similar results apply to 
turnover and dollar volume.  
Panel B divides the sample period into two sub-periods. Out of the 15 size 
quintiles related to Amihud’s, turnover, and dollar volume measures, 14 show alphas that 
are positive and significant in the first sub-period. In sharp contrast, in the second sub-
period, 10 out of the 15 show alphas that are not significantly different from zero. And in 
all five cases in which the alphas are still significant in the second period, their magnitude 
appears smaller compared to the first period.  
To perform a formal test regarding the difference between the two periods we 
constructed a “balanced portfolio” that has equal weights in each of the five long-short 
portfolios for each measure. In contrast to the portfolios in Table 8, this portfolio is 
forced to have stocks from all size quintiles. We then estimated the average alphas on the 
balanced portfolio in both sub-periods. For Amihud’s measure, the average monthly 
alpha in the first sub-period is 0.47% with a t-stat of 4.14, whereas in the second sub-
period the average alpha is 0.18% and just marginally insignificant. The difference 
between the two is significant with a t-stat of 1.96 and Wilcoxon value of 1.76. 
Qualitatively similar (though statistically a bit weaker) results hold for the two other 
volume-related measures. By contrast, Roll-Hasbrouck’s measure again does not show a 22
significant alpha for any size quintile and any of the periods. Naturally, this measure also 
does not show a trend. 
Overall, these results confirm that the decline in the profitability of liquidity-
based portfolios is intact even accounting for time trends in the size effect, and it applies 
to all size levels. Volume-related measures of liquidity yield statistically and 
economically significant alphas in the first half of our sample period. These alphas have 
significantly declined in the second sub-period.
5  Possible Explanations and Discussion 
The empirical results presented so far call for an explanation. Why would the 
sensitivity of returns to liquidity and liquidity premia decline over the years? We suggest 
two possible explanations related to changes and innovations in financial markets in 
recent decades. 
5.1 Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds are often organized as partnerships in which investments are often 
locked for long periods. Some hedge funds require an advance notice of several months 
before investors can withdraw their investments. This allows hedge funds to maintain 
relatively long investment horizons. In the presence of liquidity premia, a natural strategy 
for hedge funds is to short liquid stocks and long illiquid stocks, holding this position for 
an extended period of time.
9 The long trading horizon enables the hedge-fund to benefit 
from the liquidity premium without having to liquidate the short position early.
9 This strategy is also consistent with arbitraging mis-pricing as in Baker and Stein (2004). In their model, 
liquidity is related to overpricing of stocks driven by investors’ sentiment.  23
Long-short equity-neutral trading strategies associated with liquidity hedges have 
become very popular in hedge-funds. Hedge funds provide liquidity to markets. They buy 
illiquid stocks and sell liquid stocks, and the liquidity premium shows up in the return 
they provide to their investors.  Of course, the proliferation of hedge funds and the high 
arbitrage activity of this kind are expected to diminish the liquidity premium. Put 
differently, higher competition in the hedge fund industry reduces profit margins in the 
“business” of providing liquidity to markets. We thus conjecture that the proliferation of 
hedge funds in the past few decades has contributed to the decline in liquidity premia as 
documented in this paper.  
5.2 Index Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds 
Index funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) allow investors to buy and sell 
illiquid assets indirectly for low transaction costs (see a similar argument in Cherkes, 
Sagi, and Stanton (2008) in the context of closed-end funds). For example, direct 
investment in Russell 2000 stocks is quite expensive in terms of transaction costs. 
However, Russell 2000 ETFs (e.g., IWM) are highly liquid, presumably because (as in 
Subrahmanyam, 1991) there is almost no information trading in ETFs.
10 The ETFs and 
index funds themselves are long-term holders of the illiquid stocks, and thus incur only 
low transaction costs over the long run. They employ a passive trading strategy, and trade 
only following index changes or as a result of significant mismatches between inflows 
and outflows. While these instruments charge management fees that can be avoided by 
10 For example, during April 2006 the average relative bid-ask spread of IWM was 31 times smaller than 
the average relative bid-ask spread of the shares composing the index: 0.018% vs. 0.558%.  24
direct investment in the underlying stocks, these management fees are typically very 
low.
11
Index funds and ETFs enable short-term investors to invest indirectly in illiquid 
tocks at low cost. As a result, in the presence of index funds and ETFs, direct investors in 
illiquid stocks are more likely to be long-term investors. In other words, it is possible that 
with the proliferation of these instruments, the holding horizon of direct investors in 
illiquid stocks has increased. Therefore, we expect that investors’ compensation for 
investing in illiquid stocks has declined over the years as index funds and ETFs have 
become more popular. Importantly, none of the existing theoretical papers suggesting the 
existence of illiquidity premia considers investors that are allowed to invest in illiquid 
stocks indirectly through liquid funds that specialize in such stocks.
The past four decades have seen the introduction and proliferation of many such 
investment tools. Mutual funds grew dramatically in the late 1960s, index funds were 
introduced in the mid 1970s, and ETFs were introduced in the 1990s. The coverage and 
popularity of these instruments has constantly increased over the years. Thus, we 
hypothesize that these tools have contributed to a decline in the sensitivity of returns to 
the illiquidity of individual stocks, and to a decline in the liquidity premium.  
5.3 Discussion 
The past 40 years have seen many technological and regulatory changes that may 
have contributed to improving liquidity by lowering trading costs in financial markets. 
Our focus in this paper, however, is on the effect of liquidity on returns, and hence on the 
11 For example, in 2006, the annual expense ratio of the Russell 2000 index fund of E*TRADE was 0.22%, 
and the expense ratio of IWM was 0.2%. 25
liquidity premium. We believe that changes in the liquidity premium are associated with 
another trend of the past 40 years: the introduction and proliferation of new financial 
tools such as hedge funds, index funds, and ETFs among others.  
It appears to us that the arbitrage activity of hedge funds and the presence of low 
cost diversification tools such as index funds and ETFs lower the compensation investors 
receive for holding illiquid assets. Importantly, these arguments do not suggest that 
liquidity premia should completely vanish. Rather, they offer a plausible explanation for 
their decline.
Furthermore, while the decline in liquidity premia (those associated with volume-
related measures) appears to be an empirical regularity, the validity of our suggested 
explanations cannot be easily tested.  Insofar as hedge funds, index funds and ETFs were 
introduced and gained popularity slowly over the years, it is not possible to identify a 
single abrupt structural change that induced a decline in liquidity premia, which rules out 
an event study approach. Still, we view these explanations as economically plausible 
scenarios that are consistent with the empirical results. 
6 Conclusion 
  Using NYSE common-stock data between 1964 and 2005 and volume-
related liquidity measures, we find that both the sensitivity of returns to liquidity and 
liquidity premia have significantly declined over the past four decades. In fact, starting 
from the mid 1980s we cannot identify a significant liquidity premium. As profitability of 
liquidity-based trading strategies has declined significantly for all firm sizes, the results 
are orthogonal to trends in the size effect. 26
A caveat is nevertheless in order.  For the technical reasons explained above, our 
sample excludes NASDAQ stocks and stocks with less than 150 trading days in a given 
year and does not therefore include the most illiquid stocks. Hence, despite our inability 
to identify a liquidity premium in the more recent periods, a fair interpretation of our 
results should not be that the liquidity premium has vanished. Our results do suggest, 
however, that the liquidity premium has significantly declined over the years. 
We suggest two possible explanations for these results. It is possible that hedge-
funds being long-term investors have been arbitraging the liquidity premium. It is also 
possible that many investors have moved to investing in illiquid stocks indirectly through 
index funds and ETFs, bypassing the high transaction costs, and prolonging the 
investment horizon of the marginal investor in these stocks.
The results have important implications for valuation and asset management. A 
reduction of the average annual liquidity premium from 1.8% to 0% implies a very large 
price effect (depending on the discount rate and the expected dividend growth).
12 Thus, 
our results seem to be related to the conclusion of Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2003) 
that a part of the realized equity returns in the second half of the 20th century is due to a 
reduction in the equity discount rates. Our findings suggest that a portion of this 
reduction may have been due to the decline of the liquidity components in expected 
returns. On the asset management side the results raise a question regarding the 
profitability of liquidity-based strategies (at least for NYSE stocks), which have become 
very popular in the years since Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) seminal paper. 
12 The estimated average monthly Amihud liquidity premium during 1964-1973 was 0.15% (1,8% 
annually). See Table 4. 27
Finally, it has been argued that other attributes of firms such as disclosure policy 
may affect their cost of capital (and value) through its effect on liquidity. These claims 
should be evaluated in light of our findings.28
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
The table reports the average of the monthly cross-sectional sample statistics for all the stocks in 
our sample. For each month in the sample we calculate the mean, median, min, max, and standard 
deviation. The table reports the time averages of these statistics. The sample period for the returns 
is 1964–2005. The sample period for the rest of the variables (explanatory variables) is 1963–
2004. Ret is the CRSP monthly return adjusted for stock delisting. Amihud is Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity measure adjusted for inflation presented in December 2005 prices. Turnover is the sum 
of monthly stock volume values divided by the average number of outstanding shares throughout 
the year. Lndvol is the logarithm of the annual dollar volume (in millions of dollars). Roll-
Hasbrouck is the Gibbs estimator illiquidity measure as in Hasbrouck (2006). Beta is the size-
sorted portfolio beta calculated each year based on daily observations using the Scholes-Williams 
(1977) method. Sdret is the standard deviation of the daily returns. Divyld is the dividend yield. 
R100 is the accumulated return over the last 100 days of the year. R100yr is the accumulated 
return from the beginning of the year until the last 100 days. BM is the book-to-market ratio. Size 
is the end-of-year market capitalization. 
Variables Mean Median Min Max Std
Ret (%) 1.20 0.73 -41.70 69.87 9.38
Amihud 0.095 0.028 0.001 1.555 0.185
Turnover 0.52 0.41 0.02 5.09 0.42
Lndvol 5.00 5.02 0.82 8.91 1.58
Roll-Hasbrouck (%) 0.46 0.37 0.07 2.37 0.31
Beta 1.03 1.04 0.87 1.18 0.10
Sdret (%) 2.17 2.02 0.67 7.02 0.82
Divyld (%) 3.95 3.40 0.10 90.72 4.97
R100 (%) 4.73 3.16 -57.13 159.56 19.90
R100yr (%) 10.58 7.27 -65.23 248.93 27.88
BM 0.81 0.72 -3.71 8.75 0.64
Size ($ million) 1,761 504 12 42,934 3,858
Obs 1,255 1,267 1,043 1,598 13032
Table 2: Cross-Sectional Correlations 
The table presents the average of the monthly cross-sectional Pearson’s correlations from January 
1964 to December 2005. Ret is the CRSP monthly return adjusted for stock delisting. Amihud is 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure adjusted for inflation presented in December 2005 prices. 
Turnover is the sum of monthly stock volume values divided by the average number of 
outstanding shares throughout the year. Lndvol is the logarithm of the annual dollar volume (in 
millions of dollars). Roll-Hasbrouck is the Gibbs estimator illiquidity measure as in Hasbrouck 
(2006). Beta is the size-sorted portfolio beta calculated each year based on daily observations 
using the Scholes-Williams (1977) method. Sdret is the standard deviation of returns calculated 
each year based on daily observations. Divyld is the dividend yield. R100 is the accumulated 
return over the last 100 days of the year. R100yr is the accumulated return from the beginning of 
the year until the last 100 days. Lnsize is the logarithm of the end-of-year market capitalization 
(in millions of dollars). LnBM is the logarithm of book-to-market ratio. 
Variables Amihud Turnover Lndvol
Roll
Hasbrouck
Beta Sdret Divyld R100 R100yr Lnsize LnBM
Ret 0.016 -0.018 -0.021 0.008 0.011 -0.013 0.003 0.021 0.009 -0.012 0.018
Amihud -0.18 -0.65 0.45 0.18 0.24 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.59 0.23
Turnover 0.37 0.07 0.09 0.51 -0.17 0.00 0.13 -0.03 -0.06
Lndvol -0.40 -0.37 -0.11 -0.13 0.04 0.04 0.87 -0.31
Roll-Hasbouck 0.22 0.56 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.49 0.17
Beta 0.23 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.46 0.11
Sdret -0.26 -0.04 0.06 -0.42 0.04
Divyld -0.14 -0.13 -0.08 0.28
R100 0.05 0.13 -0.14
R100yr 0.04 -0.14
Lnsize -0.3333
Table 3: Fama-MacBeth Regressions over the Entire Sample Period 
Each month we sort the stocks into 100 portfolios based on their previous-year Amihud, Turnover, 
Lndvol, and Roll liquidity measures. In each portfolio the variable values are the equally weighted 
average of the constituents.The table presents the mean of the coefficients from monthly cross-
sectional regressions of portfolio returns on the portfolio explanatory variables (Eq. (1)). The sample 
period is 1964–2005, resulting in 504 monthly regressions. Amihud is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
measure adjusted for inflation presented in December 2005 prices. Turnover is the sum of monthly 
stock volume values divided by the average number of outstanding shares throughout the year. Lndvol 
is the logarithm of the annual dollar volume (in millions of dollars). Roll-Hasbrouck is the Gibbs 
estimator illiquidity measure as in Hasbrouck (2006). Lnsize is the logarithm of the end-of-year 
market capitalization (in millions of dollars). Beta is the size-sorted portfolio beta calculated each year 
based on daily observations using the Scholes-Williams (1977) method. Sdret is the standard deviation 
of daily returns. Divyld is the dividend yield. R100 is the accumulated return over the last 100 days of 
the year. R100yr is the accumulated return from the beginning of the year until the last 100 days. 
LnBM is the logarithm of book-to-market ratio. RSQ is the average of the R-squared of all the 
monthly regressions. The monthly liquidity premium is the product of the monthly liquidity 
coefficient and the monthly average liquidity measure calculated for Amihud’s and Roll’s measures. 
T-stats are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 2 . 1 11 . 9 80 . 7 11 . 8 3
(2.28) (1.73) (0.76) (1.63)
Amihud 0.44
(1.65)
Turnover -0.58
(4.66)
Lndvol -0.10
(1.27)
Roll-Hasbrouck 0.08
(0.51)
Lnsize -0.05 -0.08 0.06 -0.05
(0.98) (1.16) (0.53) (0.79)
Beta -0.45 -0.50 0.60 -0.25
(0.66) (0.57) (0.84) (0.30)
Sdret -0.18 0.00 -0.10 -0.13
(1.69) (0.00) (0.90) (1.21)
Divyld -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.69) (0.35) (0.25) (0.87)
R100 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(3.34) (1.86) (3.31) (3.51)
R100yr 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 0
(0.03) (1.97) (0.87) (1.86)
LnBM 0.30 0.12 0.25 0.30
(3.70) (1.42) (2.86) (3.44)
RSQ 0.239 0.267 0.230 0.220
Liquidity Premium (%) 0.024 0.030
t-stat (1.30) (0.44)34
Table 4: Fama-MacBeth Regressions — Four Sub-Periods
Each month we sort the stocks into 100 portfolios based on their previous-year Amihud, 
Turnover, and Roll liquidity measures. In each portfolio the variable values are the equally 
weighted average of the portfolio constituents. The table presents the mean of the coefficients 
from monthly cross-sectional regressions of portfolio returns on the portfolio explanatory 
variables (Eq. (1)). The sub-periods are 1964–1973, 1974–1984, 1985–1995, and 1996–2005. 
Amihud is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure adjusted for inflation presented in December 
2005 prices. Turnover is the sum of monthly stock volume values divided by the average number 
of outstanding shares throughout the year. Roll-Hasbrouck is the Gibbs estimator illiquidity 
measure as in Hasbrouck (2006). Lnsize is the logarithm of the end-of-year market capitalization 
(in millions of dollars).Beta is the size-sorted portfolio beta calculated every year based on daily 
observations using the Scholes-Williams (1977) method. Sdret is the standard deviation of the 
returns calculated every year based on daily observations. Divyld is the dividend yield. R100 is 
the accumulated return over the last 100 days of the year. R100yr is the accumulated return from 
the beginning of the year till the last 100 days. LnBM is the logarithm of book-to-market ratio. 
RSQ is the average of the R-squared of all the monthly regressions in a period. The monthly 
liquidity premium is the product of the monthly liquidity coefficient and the monthly average 
liquidity measure calculated for Amihud’s and Roll’s measures. T-stats are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
(1) (2) (3)
64-73 74-84 85-95 96-05 64-73 74-84 85-95 96-05 64-73 74-84 85-95 96-05
Intercept 2.01 2.26 0.65 3.66 3.02 2.08 0.57 2.38 3.41 -0.34 2.70 1.68
(0.93) (1.08) (0.37) (2.88) (1.29) (0.79) (0.25) (1.38) (1.52) (0.13) (1.13) (0.99)
Amihud 2.54 -0.21 0.04 -0.50
(3.01) (0.67) (0.12) (0.90)
Turnover -0.89 -1.26 -0.11 -0.03
(3.67) (3.70) (0.62) (0.16)
Roll-Hasbrouck 0.17 -0.04 0.16 0.03
(0.49) (0.17) (0.61) (0.08)
Lnsize -0.10 -0.21 0.16 -0.06 -0.24 -0.25 0.18 0.01 -0.18 -0.13 0.08 0.02
(0.75) (1.89) (1.96) (0.71) (1.53) (1.79) (1.71) (0.09) (1.20) (0.87) (0.90) (0.14)
Beta -0.70 0.47 0.33 -2.07 -1.31 -0.26 0.23 -0.76 -1.80 2.61 -0.97 -1.05
(0.44) (0.33) (0.28) (1.61) (0.80) (0.14) (0.13) (0.43) (1.11) (1.54) (0.54) (0.68)
Sdret -0.25 -0.02 -0.21 -0.24 0.04 0.45 -0.37 -0.13 -0.18 -0.08 -0.24 -0.03
(1.06) (0.08) (1.10) (1.14) (0.14) (1.81) (1.85) (0.51) (0.71) (0.37) (1.30) (0.11)
Divyld -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.02
(0.27) (0.49) (1.48) (0.34) (0.48) (1.56) (0.12) (0.80) (0.92) (0.33) (1.14) (0.30)
R100 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
(1.06) (0.83) (3.12) (1.38) (0.57) (1.08) (1.14) (0.87) (1.32) (1.46) (2.83) (1.25)
R100yr 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.55) (0.02) (0.64) (2.33) (2.38) (0.99) (0.34) (0.01) (1.79_ (1.24) (0.42) (0.11)
LnBM 0.13 0.48 0.46 0.08 0.13 0.29 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.56 0.48 -0.07
(1.38) (2.54) (2.89) (0.46) (1.36) (1.37) (0.12) (0.26) (1.90) (2.60) (2.83) (0.41)
RSQ 0.23 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.35 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.21
Liquidity Premium (%) 0.15 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.02
t-stat (2.87) (0.95) (0.60) (0.97) (0.43) (0.24) (0.58) (0.13)
Variables 35
Table 5: Fama-MacBeth Regressions — Two Sub-Periods 
Each month we sort the stocks into 100 portfolios based on their previous-year Amihud, Turnover, 
and Roll liquidity measures. In each portfolio the variable values are the equally weighted average of 
the portfolio constituents. The table presents the mean of the coefficients from monthly cross-sectional 
regressions of portfolio returns on the portfolio explanatory variables (Eq. (1)). The sub-periods are 
1964–1984 and 1985–2005. Amihud is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure adjusted for inflation 
presented in December 2005 prices. Turnover is the sum of monthly stock volume values divided by 
the average number of outstanding shares throughout the year. Roll-Hasbrouck is the Gibbs estimator 
illiquidity measure as in Hasbrouck (2006). Lnsize is the logarithm of the end-of-year market 
capitalization (in millions of dollars).Beta is the size-sorted portfolio beta calculated every year based 
on daily observations using the Scholes-Williams (1977) method. Sdret is the standard deviation of the 
returns calculated every year based on daily observations. Divyld is the dividend yield. R100 is the 
accumulated return over the last 100 days of the year. R100yr is the accumulated return from the 
beginning of the year till the last 100 days. LnBM is the logarithm of book-to-market ratio. RSQ is the 
average of the R-squared of all the monthly regressions in a period. The monthly liquidity premium is 
the product of the monthly liquidity coefficient and the monthly average liquidity measure calculated 
for Amihud’s and Roll’s measures. T-stats are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
(1) (2) (3)
64-84 85-05 64-84 85-05 64-84 85-05
Intercept 2.14 2.08 2.53 1.43 1.45 2.21
(1.43) (1.89) (1.43) (0.98) (0.85) (1.49)
Amihud 1.10 -0.22
(2.51) (0.71)
Turnover -1.08 -0.07
(5.11) (0.58)
Roll-Hasbrouck 0.06 0.10
(0.29) (0.43)
Lnsize -0.16 0.05 -0.25 0.10 -0.15 0.05
(1.84) (0.91) (2.36) (1.27) (1.46) (0.68)
Beta -0.09 -0.82 -0.76 -0.24 0.51 -1.01
(0.09) (0.94) (0.61) (0.19) (0.43) (0.84)
Sdret -0.13 -0.23 0.25 -0.25 -0.13 -0.14
(0.82) (1.59) (1.39) (1.62) (0.77) (0.96)
Divyld -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
(0.53) (0.46) (1.25) (0.74) (0.91) (0.37)
R100 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.32) (3.30) (1.19) (1.44) (1.97) (2.95)
R100yr 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
(1.09) (1.10) (2.39) (0.24) (2.15) (0.40)
LnBM 0.31 0.28 0.22 0.03 0.38 0.22
(2.88) (2.37) (1.78) (0.26) (3.14) (1.74)
RSQ 0.25 0.23 0.31 0.23 0.24 0.20
Liquidity Premium (%) 0.055 -0.008 0.013 0.046
t-stat (1.71) (0.48) (0.14) (0.47)
t-stats of:
Liquidity coefficient differences 2.47 4.16 0.14
Liquidity premium differences 1.74 0.24
Wilcoxon test of:
Liquidity coefficient differences 2.31 4.28 0.12
Liquidity premium differences 2.02 0.14
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Table 6: Non-Parametric Tests for Trend 
The table presents the Spearman and Kendall non-parametric tests for trends applied to the 504 
monthly estimates obtained from model (3). We apply the non-parametric tests to the coefficient 
estimates of Amihud, Turnover, and Roll-Hasbrouck liquidity measures. The test of the liquidity 
premium is only to the Amihud measure. Parametric Pearson’s correlations are reported for 
completeness. P-values, reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, test against the 
null hypothesis of no trend. 
Coefficients Liquidity Premium
Amihud Turnover Roll-Hasbrouck Amihud
Spearman -0.16 0.18 0.00 -0.15
p-value (0.00)  <.0001 (0.92) (0.00)
Kendall -0.11 0.11 0.00 -0.10
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.96) (0.00)
Pearson -0.15 0.16 0.00 -0.13
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.93) (0.00)37
Table 7: Monthly Excess Return Averages of Liquidity-Based Portfolios 
In each year between 1964 and 2005 we sort the stocks into ten deciles based on their previous-year 
Amihud, Turnover, Lndvol, and Roll-Hasbrouck liquidity measures. The top decile consists of the most 
illiquid stocks and the bottom decile consists of the most liquid stocks. We construct three portfolios: The 
top decile portfolio assigns equal weights to the most illiquid stocks; the bottom decile portfolio assigns 
equal weights to the most liquid stocks; and the top-minus-bottom portfolio is long in the top decile and 
short in the bottom decile portfolios. The portfolios are rebalanced annually. Panel A reports the average 
monthly excess returns (returns less risk-free rate) for each of the three portfolios during the four sub-
periods 1964–1973, 1974–1984, 1985–1995, and 1996–2005. Panel B reports the average monthly excess 
returns over the periods 1964–1984 and 1985–2005.  
Panel A – Four sub-periods 
Amihud  
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat
64-73 0.87% 1.64 0.06% 0.13 0.81% 2.67
74-84 1.63% 2.76 0.18% 0.40 1.46% 3.56
85-95 0.75% 1.70 0.99% 2.67 -0.24% -0.80
96-05 0.89% 2.09 0.67% 1.57 0.23% 0.60
Turnover 
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat
64-73 0.24% 0.76 -0.22% -0.30 0.46% 0.85
74-84 1.07% 2.67 0.71% 1.08 0.36% 0.98
85-95 0.72% 2.20 0.50% 0.93 0.23% 0.78
96-05 1.01% 3.07 0.64% 0.97 0.36% 0.80
Lndvol 
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat
64-73 0.76% 1.70 -0.04% -0.07 0.79% 2.74
74-84 1.62% 3.12 0.22% 0.46 1.40% 3.81
85-95 0.78% 1.93 0.91% 2.33 -0.13% -0.52
96-05 0.93% 2.44 0.71% 1.48 0.22% 0.56
Roll-Hasbrouck
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat
64-73 0.53% 0.84 0.37% 0.90 0.17% 0.51
74-84 1.54% 2.21 0.63% 1.37 0.91% 2.17
85-95 0.69% 1.40 0.92% 2.62 -0.23% -0.79
96-05 1.02% 1.86 0.75% 2.25 0.27% 0.7438
Panel B – Two sub-periods 
Amihud 
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat
64-84 1.27% 3.19 0.12% 0.39 1.15% 4.45
85-05 0.82% 2.66 0.84% 2.99 -0.02% -0.07
t-stat 0.90 1.72 3.34
Wilcoxon 0.46 2.25 3.15
Turnover 
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat
64-84 0.67% 2.61 0.26% 0.54 0.41% 1.27
85-05 0.86% 3.71 0.57% 1.35 0.29% 1.11
t-stat 0.53 0.47 0.29
Wilcoxon 1.41 0.70 0.33
Lndvol 
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat
64-84 1.21% 3.51 0.10% 0.29 1.11% 4.70
85-05 0.85% 3.06 0.82% 2.66 0.03% 0.15
t-stat 0.81 1.54 3.29
Wilcoxon 0.41 1.95 2.96
Roll-Hasbrouck
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat Excess Return t-stat
64-84 1.06% 2.24 0.51% 1.63 0.56% 2.07
85-05 0.85% 2.32 0.84% 3.47 0.01% 0.03
t-stat 0.36 0.85 1.59
Wilcoxon 0.27 1.37 1.2739
Table 8: Averages of Out-of-Sample Four-Factor Alphas of Liquidity-Based 
Portfolios
In each year between 1964 and 2005 we sort the stocks into ten deciles based on their previous-year 
Amihud, Turnover, Lndvol, and Roll-Hasbrouck liquidity measures. The top decile consists of the most 
illiquid stocks and the bottom decile consists of the most liquid stocks. We construct three portfolios: The 
top decile portfolio assigns equal weights to the most illiquid stocks; the bottom decile portfolio assigns 
equal weights to the most liquid stocks; and the top-minus-bottom portfolio is long in the top decile and 
short in the bottom decile portfolios. The portfolios are rebalanced annually. Panel A reports the average 
monthly out-of-sample four-factor alphas calculated using Eq. (2) for each of the four sub-periods: 1964–
1973, 1974–1984, 1985–1995, and 1996–2005. Panel B repeats the analysis for two sub-periods: 1964–
1984 and 1985–2005.
Panel A – Four sub-periods 
Amihud  
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat
64-73 0.50% 3.87 -0.27% -2.47 0.78% 3.97
74-84 0.27% 2.02 0.06% 0.75 0.21% 1.37
85-95 0.13% 0.83 0.10% 1.63 0.03% 0.17
96-05 -0.02% -0.08 0.11% 0.92 -0.13% -0.54
Turnover 
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat
64-73 0.25% 2.21 -0.85% -4.18 1.10% 4.09
74-84 0.36% 3.63 -0.33% -1.79 0.69% 3.05
85-95 0.14% 1.24 -0.32% -2.06 0.46% 2.17
96-05 0.14% 0.98 -0.13% -0.54 0.27% 0.97
Lndvol 
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat
64-73 0.53% 4.33 -0.50% -3.09 1.03% 4.19
74-84 0.46% 3.45 0.03% 0.27 0.43% 2.54
85-95 0.21% 1.47 0.01% 0.18 0.20% 1.27
96-05 0.08% 0.42 0.19% 1.33 -0.11% -0.46
Roll-Hasbrouck
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat
64-73 0.18% 1.36 0.17% 2.06 0.01% 0.03
74-84 0.12% 0.71 0.23% 2.10 -0.11% -0.54
85-95 -0.02% -0.11 0.15% 1.66 -0.17% -0.89
96-05 0.06% 0.29 -0.09% -0.60 0.15% 0.6740
Panel B – Two sub-periods 
Amihud 
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat
64-84 0.38% 4.07 -0.10% -1.42 0.48% 3.87
85-05 0.06% -0.34 0.11% 1.60 -0.05% -0.34
t-stat 2.16 2.22 2.90
Wilcoxon 1.69 1.56 2.33
Turnover 
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat
64-84 0.31% 4.12 -0.58% -4.21 0.88% 5.08
85-05 0.14% 2.14 -0.23% -1.63 0.37% 2.14
t-stat 1.47 1.75 2.10
Wilcoxon 0.84 1.43 2.12
Lndvol 
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat
64-84 0.49% 5.44 -0.22% -2.37 0.72% 4.85
85-05 0.15% 0.37 0.10% 1.26 0.05% 0.37
t-stat 2.37 2.64 3.28
Wilcoxon 1.98 2.12 2.88
Roll-Hasbrouck
Top Decile Bottom Decile Top minus Bottom
Years Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat Alphas t-stat
64-84 0.15% 1.38 0.20% 2.92 -0.06% -0.42
85-05 0.02% -0.13 0.04% 0.47 -0.02% -0.13
t-stat 0.77 1.51 0.19
Wilcoxon 0.27 0.86 0.3641
Table 9: Averages of Out-of-Sample Four-Factor Alphas — Portfolios Pre-Sorted 
by Size 
In each month between 1964 and 2005 we sort the stocks in our sample to five size quintiles 
based on the previous end-of-year size. Sizes 1 to 5 refer to the smallest to largest size quintiles. 
Within each size quintile we sort the stocks into five illiquidity quintiles based on the previous 
year’s Amihud, Turnover, Lndvol, and Roll-Hasbrouck liquidity measures. We then form five 
long-short liquidity-based trading portfolios, one for each size quintile. The portfolios are long in 
the most illiquid stocks and short in the most liquid stocks within each size quintile. The 
portfolios are rebalanced annually. Panel A reports the average monthly out-of-sample four-factor 
alphas calculated using Eq. (2) for each of the four sub-periods: 1964–1973, 1974–1984, 1985–
1995, and 1996–2005. In Panel B the sample period is split into two sub-periods. The panel 
reports the alphas for these two sub-periods and the T-statistics of the differences between period 
alphas.
Panel A – Four sub-periods 
Amihud 
Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Balanced
Years
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
64-73 1.11% 4.30 0.84% 3.34 0.74% 2.93 0.46% 2.00 0.48% 2.29 0.73% 4.02
74-84 0.30% 1.20 0.46% 1.84 0.41% 1.87 -0.06% -0.30 0.13% 0.79 0.25% 1.72
85-95 0.71% 2.90 0.60% 2.56 0.28% 1.33 0.36% 2.08 0.13% 0.93 0.41% 3.74
96-05 0.38% 1.12 -0.02% -0.07 -0.15% -0.57 -0.48% -1.56 -0.14% -0.70 -0.08% -0.49
Turnover 
Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Balanced
Years
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
64-73 0.94% 3.69 0.92% 3.15 0.60% 2.10 0.62% 2.13 0.70% 2.58 0.76% 3.27
74-84 0.65% 2.36 0.60% 2.61 0.48% 1.99 0.43% 1.76 0.36% 1.58 0.51% 2.95
85-95 0.90% 3.33 0.54% 2.22 0.34% 1.34 0.19% 0.93 0.15% 0.74 0.42% 2.80
96-05 0.64% 1.84 0.50% 1.50 0.16% 0.55 -0.09% -0.28 -0.20% -0.65 0.20% 0.95
Lndvol 
Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Balanced
Years
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
64-73 1.22% 4.24 0.96% 3.36 0.66% 2.34 0.65% 2.44 0.56% 2.30 0.81% 3.60
74-84 0.55% 2.01 0.59% 2.39 0.59% 2.41 0.27% 1.18 0.36% 1.79 0.47% 2.84
85-95 1.11% 4.29 0.70% 3.13 0.34% 1.35 0.22% 1.08 0.10% 0.67 0.49% 3.69
96-05 0.49% 1.49 0.39% 1.24 0.08% 0.27 -0.33% -1.12 -0.06% -0.27 0.11% 0.57
Roll-Hasbrouck
Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Balanced
Years
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
64-73 0.21% 0.88 0.19% 0.87 -0.19% -0.98 -0.09% -0.57 -0.28% -1.95 -0.03% -0.28
74-84 -0.28% -1.00 0.16% 0.75 0.04% 0.23 -0.18% -0.97 -0.10% -0.49 -0.07% -0.58
85-95 0.02% 0.06 -0.24% -1.15 0.12% 0.63 -0.07% -0.39 -0.18% -1.30 -0.07% -0.61
96-05 0.20% 0.67 -0.23% -0.91 0.10% 0.51 0.05% 0.22 0.28% 1.04 0.08% 0.5242
Panel B – Two sub-periods 
Amihud 
Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Balanced
Years
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
64-84 0.68% 3.78 0.64% 3.62 0.57% 3.42 0.19% 1.19 0.30% 2.24 0.47% 4.14
85-05 0.55% 2.69 0.30% 1.63 0.07% 0.44 -0.04% -0.25 0.00% 0.00 0.18% 1.75
t-stat 0.49 1.33 2.09 0.98 1.66 1.96
Wilcoxon 0.65 1.29 2.08 0.82 1.71 1.64
Turnover 
Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Balanced
Years
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
64-84 0.79% 4.19 0.75% 4.10 0.54% 2.90 0.52% 2.77 0.52% 2.97 0.62% 4.41
85-05 0.77% 3.58 0.52% 2.57 0.25% 1.33 0.06% 0.33 -0.02% -0.10 0.32% 2.49
t-stat 0.05 0.84 1.09 1.77 2.14 1.62
Wilcoxon 0.18 1.05 1.15 1.39 1.88 1.50
Lndvol 
Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Balanced
Years
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
64-84 0.87% 4.37 0.76% 4.09 0.62% 3.37 0.45% 2.59 0.45% 2.91 0.63% 4.58
85-05 0.82% 3.93 0.55% 2.90 0.21% 1.13 -0.04% -0.25 0.02% 0.17 0.31% 2.67
t-stat 0.19 0.79 1.55 2.01 2.09 1.78
Wilcoxon 0.03 0.96 1.50 1.59 2.14 1.70
Roll-Hasbrouck
Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Balanced
Years
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
Average 
Alpha t-stat
64-84 -0.04% -0.23 0.17% 1.14 -0.07% -0.56 -0.14% -1.12 -0.19% -1.45 -0.05% -0.63
85-05 0.10% 0.55 -0.24% -1.45 0.11% 0.81 -0.01% -0.06 0.04% 0.28 0.00% 0.02
t-stat 0.55 1.84 0.97 0.67 1.18 0.43
Wilcoxon 0.40 1.66 0.75 0.72 1.15 0.5543
Figure 1: Liquidity Measures Averages over Time
Figure 1-A — Amihud Measure 
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Figure 1-A presents the yearly averages of the monthly cross-sectional Amihud’s 
illiquidity measures (Amihud) scaled for inflation in December 2005 prices. 
Figure 1-B —Turnover Measure 
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Figure 1-B presents the yearly averages of the monthly cross-sectional Turnover measure. 44
Figure 1-C — Lndvol Measure 
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Figure 1-C depicts the yearly averages of the monthly cross-sectional Lndvol measure. 
Figure 1-D — Roll-Hasbrouck Measure 
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Figure 1-D depicts the yearly averages of the monthly cross-sectional Roll-Hasbrouck 
measure. 45
Figure 2: Average Illiquidity Cross-Sectional Regression Coefficients and Amihud 
Liquidity Premiums 
Figure 2-A — Liquidity Coefficient 
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Figure 2-A depicts the yearly coefficient averages of Amihud’s illiquidity from January 
1964 to December 2005 based on specification (1) of Table 3. 
Figure 2-B — Liquidity Premium 
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Figure 2-B depicts the 12-month average for each year of the liquidity premium measure 
from January 1964 to December 2005 based on specification (1) of Table 3.  46
Figure 3: Alphas of Long-Short Liquidity Portfolios Based on Amihud Measure 
-4.0%
-3.0%
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
Figure 3 presents the 12-month average for each year of the four-factor alphas of a 
portfolio that is long in the most illiquid stocks and short in the most liquid stocks based 
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